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Abstract: This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional Economics and presents a 
comprehensive framework for analyzing the risk management in agri-food sector. First, it specifies the 
diverse (natural, technical, behavioral, economic, policy etc.) type of agri-food risks, and the (market, 
private, public and hybrid) modes of their management. Second, it defines the efficiency of risk 
management and identifies (personal, institutional, dimensional, technological, natural) factors of 
governance choice. Next, it presents stages in analysis of risk management and for the improvement of 
public intervention in the risk governance. Finally, it identifies contemporary opportunities and 
challenges for risk governance in agri-food chain.  
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Introduction  
 
Around the globe the issues of management of diverse (natural, market, criminal, policy etc.) risks in 
agrarian and food sectors are among the most topical in academic, business and policies debates 
(Babcock, 2004; CIPS, 2012; Deep and Dani, 2009; EU, 2011; OECD, 2008; Olsson and 
Skjöldebrand, 2008; RPDRM, 2012; Schaffnit-Chatterjee, 2010; Shepherd et al., 2006; Trench et al., 
2011; Weaver and Kim, 2000). In last decades, newly evolving uncertainty, risks and crisis associated 
with the progression of natural environment, products and technology safety, social demands, policies, 
economy, and globalization put additional challenges on existing system of risk management in agri-
food sector.  
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Risks management studies in agri-food sector predominately focus on technical methods and 
capability to perceive, prevent, mitigate, and recover from diverse threats and risks (Barker, 2005; 
DTRA & IIBR, 2011; Hefnawy, 2011; Jaffee et al., 2008; Luning et al., 2006). In most economic 
publications a Neoclassical approach is applied, the risks is studied as other commodity regulated by 
market supply and demand, and farmers “willingness to pay” for an insurance contract in relations to 
his risk aversion risk probability and magnitude of damages modeled (Gerasymenko and Zhemoyda, 
2009; OECD, 2011). Market and private failures are acknowledged, and the needs for public 
intervention in risk management increasingly recognized. At the same time, risk management analysis 
largely ignore a significant “human nature” based (bounded rationality, opportunism) risk, critical 
factors for the managerial choice such as the institutional environment and the transaction costs, and 
diversity of alternative (market, private, collective, public, hybrid) modes of risk management. As a 
result the efficiency and complementarities of risk management modes can not be properly assessed. 
Despite significant advancement in the risk management technologies and the “menu” of risk 
reduction, mitigation and copping strategies a great number of failures and challenges (production, 
supply chain, food and human safety, environmental etc.) continue to persist in agri-food sector (Dani 
and Deep, 2010; EU, 2011;  Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006; OECD, 2011; Luning et al., 2006). 
Consequently, a greater attention is directed to the system of governance which eventually determines 
the exploration of technological opportunities and the state of agri-food security (Bachev, 2010, 
2011c).  
This paper incorporates the interdisciplinary New Institutional Economics (Coase, 1939, 1960; 
Furuboth and Richter, 1998; North, 1990; Williamson, 1981, 1996) and presents a comprehensive 
framework for analyzing the risk management in agri-food sector.  First, it specifies the type of agri-
food risks and the modes of their management. Second, it defines the efficiency of risk management 
and identifies the factors of governance choice. Next, it presents stages in analysis of risk management 
and for the improvement of public intervention in the risk governance. Finally, it identifies 
contemporary opportunities and challenges for risk governance in agri-food chain. The ultimate goal is 
to improve the analysis of risk management in agri-food sector, and to assist public policies and risk 
management strategies and collective actions of individual agents. 
 
 
 
 3
1. Agri-food risks and modes of risk governance 
 
Risk related to agri-food sector is any current or future hazard (event) with a significant negative 
impact(s). It is either idiosyncratic, accidental, low probability, unpredictable events, or systematic - 
high probability, “predictable” event.  
The risk and threat could be of natural (e.g. adverse weather, insect attract, catastrophic event), 
technological (“pure” technical failures), or human origin (individual or collective actions/inactions, 
“human nature”), or a combination of them. The individual behavior and actions causing risks may 
range from: agent’s ignorance (lack of sufficient knowledge, information, and training); risk-taking 
(retention) strategy of individuals (accepting “higher than normal” risk); mismanagement (bad 
planning, prevention, recovery); deliberate opportunistic behavior (pre-contractual cheating and 
“adverse selection”, post-contractual “moral hazard”); criminal acts (stealing property or yields, arson, 
invasion on individual safety); terrorist attacks (contamination of inputs and outputs aiming “mass 
terror”) etc.  
The collective actions which are source of risks are commonly related to: economic dynamics and 
uncertainty (changing demand, market price volatility, international competition, market “failures” 
and disbalances such as “lack“ of labor, credit, certain inputs); collective orders (“free riding”, codes 
of behaviors, industry standards, strikes and trade restrictions, community rules and restrictions); or 
public order (political instability and uncertainty, evolution in informal and forma social norms and 
standards, public “failures” such as bad, delayed, under/over intervention, law and contracts 
enforcements, mismanagement, “inefficiency by design”), etc.  
The agri-food sector risk could be faced by an agri-food sector component (e.g. risk on a dairy-farm, 
on a food processor, on a trader) or it could be caused by the agri-food sector (risk from farming, from 
food processing, from food-distribution etc.).  The risk could be internal for agri-food chain such as 
hazards cased by one element to another, and staying in or mitigating within the sector. It could also be 
external associated with hazard coming from outside factors (such as natural environment, government 
policy, international trade), and/or affecting external components (consumers, residents, industries, 
nature). Finally, the risks could be private, when it is taken by individuals, collectives, entities, 
industries; or it is often public affecting large groups, communities, consumers, society, future 
generations.  
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The risk is big when there is great likelihood of a risky event to occur and that is combined with 
substantial possible negative consequences. The later may take a great variety of forms - damaged 
human and livestock health and property, inferior yields and income, lost market positions, food and 
environmental contamination etc. When risk is considerable it would likely be associated with 
significant costs which sometimes are hardly expressed in monetary terms - e.g. human health hazards, 
degradared soils, lost biodiversity and eco-system services etc. Thus the “rational” agents maximizing 
own welfare will be interested to invest in risk prevention and reduction. 
In a narrow (technical) sense the risk management comprises the individual, collective and public 
action(s) for reducing or eliminating risk and its negative consequences. In a broader sense the risk 
management is the specific system of social order (governance) responsible for a particular 
behavior(s) of agents and determining way(s) of assignment, protection, exchange, coordination, 
stimulation and disputing diverse risks, rights, resources, and activities (Bachev, 2011c). In the 
particular socio-economic, technological and natural environment, the specific system of risk 
governance “put in place” is intimately responsible for the efficiency of detection, prevention, 
mitigation, and reduction of diverse threats and risks and their negative consequences.  
Generic forms and mechanisms of risk governance are (Figure1):  
   
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Generic risks, factors, stages and modes of risk governance in agri-food sector 
 
- private modes (“private and collective order”) - diverse private initiatives, and specially designed 
contractual and organizational arrangements tailored to particular features of risks and agents - codes 
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of behavior, diverse (rational, security, future etc.) contracts, cooperatives, associations, business 
ventures etc. 
- market modes (“invisible hand of market”) - various decentralized initiatives governed by free 
market price movements and market competition such as risk trading (selling and buying insurance), 
future contracts and options, production and trade of special (organic, fair-trade, origins) products etc.  
- public modes (“public order”) - various forms of a third-party public (Government, international) 
intervention in market and private sectors such as public information, regulation, ban, assistance, 
funding, assurance, taxation, provision etc.  
Sometimes, risk management in agri-food sector could be effectively done though “self-management” 
– e.g. production management, adaptation to industry and formal standards, “self-insurance” though 
keeping stocks, financial reserves etc. For instance, primitive forms of on farm risk management 
through improving production management are widespread such as control and security enhancement, 
appropriate (pest, disease, weather resist) varieties, technology and production structure, product 
diversification, dislocation etc. Similarly, off-farm enterprise (income) diversification is a major 
strategy for risk management in most of the European farms (Bachev and Tanic, 2011). 
However, very often, risk management requires an effective governance of relations with other agents 
– exchange and regulations of rights, alignment of conflicts, coalition of resources, collective or public 
actions at regional, national and transnational scales. Accordingly, a risk could be “managed” through 
a market mode (e.g. purchase of insurance, hedging with future price contingency contracts), a private 
mode (contractual or literal integration, cooperation), a public form (state regulation, guarantee, 
compensation), or a hybrid combination of other forms.   
 
2. Efficiency of risk management 
 
Individual modes of risk governance are with unequal efficiency since they have dissimilar potential 
to reduce likelihood and impact of risk, and command different costs (Bachev, 2010). Principally, the 
market or collective governance has bigger advantages over the internal mode (“own protection”) 
since they allow the exploration of economies of scale and scope in risk prevention and bearing 
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(sharing) negative consequences2. However, the risk trading and/or sharing is often associated with 
significant transaction costs for finding best partners, prices, formulating and disputing terms of 
exchange, coalition, safeguarding against new risk from opportunistic behavior of counterparts or 
partners etc. Consequently, market and private sector “fail” to govern effectively existing and likely 
risks in agri-food sector, and there is a need for a “state intervention” in risk management (assisting 
farmers cooperation, public costs-sharing or provision, mandatory insurance regulation etc.). Thus 
“governance matters” and applying a proper structure of risk management is an important part of the 
overall process of the optimization (effective allocation) of resources.  
Following Coase’s logic (1960) if property rights were well-defined and transaction costs were zero 
then all risks would be managed in the most efficient (socially optimal) way independent of the 
specific mode of governance3. Then individual agents would either sell out their risk to a specialized 
market agent, or safeguard against the risk through terms of a private contract, or join a risk-sharing 
organization of interested parties. The risk-taking would be distributed (exchanged, shared by) agents 
according to their will while the total costs for risk prevention, assurance, reduction, and recovery 
minimized. The rational choice for an individual agent would be to get rid of a significant risk 
altogether – to sell the risk out to a specialized market agent (a risk-taker). Such market governance 
would optimize the risk-taking and minimize the “technological costs” for risk assurance and recovery 
exploring the entire potential for economies of size and scope at national or transnational scales.  
However, when property rights are not well-defined or enforced and transaction costs4 are high then 
the type of governance is essential for the extent and costs of risk protection. For instance, an internal 
(ownership) mode is often preferred because of the comparative protective and costs advantages for 
“standard” natural or behavioral risk management over the outside (market or contract) modes. What 
is more, frequently the enormous transaction costs could even block the development of insurance 
market or the emergence of mutually beneficial (collective) risk-sharing organization. It is well known 
that despite “common” interests and the huge potential for risk minimization collective organization 
for risk-sharing are not or hardly developed by stallholders. 
                                                 
2 Most studies on risk management in agriculture focus on modeling farmers “willingness to pay” for a risk 
contract in relations to risk’s probability and amount of likely damages (e.g. Gerasymenko and Zhemoyda, 
2009). 
3 In such a world some kind of risks would not even exist or be of no importance - e.g. risks related to adverse 
human behavior. 
4 Transaction costs are the costs associated with the distribution, protection and the exchange of diverse rights 
and obligations of individual, groups, and generations (Bachev, 2010).  
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Furthermore, the formal and informal institutional restrictions could make some modes of risk 
governance impossible - e.g. risk assuring monopolies and/or cartel arrangements are illegal in many 
countries while most entrepreneurial risk-taking is endorsed (the “low risk - low profit” principle). 
Thus, not all modes of risk governance are constantly feasible in any socio-economic settings5.  
What is more, individual agents differ significantly in their capacity to recognize, take, pay for 
prevention, and manage a risk. For instance, a risk-taking farmer prefers risky but more productive 
forms - e.g. bank credit for a new profitable venture. Besides, individual agents have quite different 
interests for effective management of a particular risk(s) since they get unlike benefits and costs from 
risk management.   
Last but not least important, there is no singe universal form for management of divers type of risks 
and according to the specific feature of each risk (origin, probability, likely damages) there will be 
different most effective form of governance. For instance, while low probable “standard” (natural, 
criminal) risk could be effectively governed by a classical market contract (purchase of insurance), 
most behavioral risks require special private modes (branding, long-term or interlink contracts, vertical 
integration), a high damaging risk from terrorist attract necessities specialized public forms 
(intelligence, security enforcement) etc. 
Hence, depending on the kind and severity of risk, and the interests and personal characteristics of 
individuals, and the specific natural, economic and institutional environment, there will be different 
(most) efficient forms of governing a particular kind of risk. Consequently, some governance mix will 
always exist to deal with divers risks associated with the agri-food sector (Bachev and Nanseki, 2008). 
In many cases, an effective risk management leads to a considerable reduction or removal of a 
particular type of risk. However, often complete risk elimination is either very costly (“unaffordable” 
by individuals or society) or practically impossible (when uncertainty associated with future events is 
enormous, the transaction costs are very high). For instance, certain natural risk will always exist 
despite the available system of management. Besides, it is practically impossible to write a “compete” 
contract (e.g. for insurance supply and trading risk) including all probable future contingencies, and 
subsequent rights and obligations of each party. Subsequently, some transacting risk will always 
retain. Therefore, an effective risk management is always connected with needs for some trade-off 
                                                 
5 Nevertheless, if costs associated with the illegitimate forms is not high (possibility for disclosure low, 
enforcement and punishment insignificant) while benefits are considerable, then the more effective governance 
prevail – large gray or black economies are widespread around the globe. 
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between the benefits from reducing a particular risk (saved costs, minimized impacts) and the related 
costs for the risk governance6.  
Furthermore, an individual mode of governance could offer an effective protection from different 
(multiple) risks. Besides, an effective management of one type of risk might be associated with 
exposure to new type of risk/costs – e.g. the vertical integration eliminates the “market risk” but 
creates a risk from opportunisms of partners. Moreover, the level of (overall) risk exposure is typically 
determined by the “critical” (most important) risk and the integral risk is rarely a sum of the 
individual risks.  
Frequently, there are a number of possible (alternative) forms of governance of a particular type of 
risk – e.g. “risk to environment” could be managed as voluntary actions of individual farmers, 
environmental cooperation, private contracts with interested parties, assisted by a third party 
organization, public eco-contact, public regulation, hybrid forms etc.  In certain cases, some forms of 
risk management are practically impossible or social unacceptable – e.g. insurance markets do not 
develop for many kind of agro-food risks and the private management is the only option; management 
of many environmental risks and challenges require collective actions at local, eco-system, regional or 
transnational levels etc. In modern societies many type of risks management are publicly imposed – 
e.g. food safety risk is under public management and harmonized in EU, there are strict regulations on 
GMC, “precaution principle” is mandatory for environmental related projects and carried out by the 
state authority, “safety nets” are organized as public projects etc. 
Therefore, a comparative analysis is to be employed to select among (technically, economically, 
socially) feasible alternatives the most efficient one – that which would reduce the overall risk to 
“acceptable” level, and which would require minimum total (risk assurance and risk governance) 
costs. The later must include all current and future costs associated with the risk management – the 
current technological and management costs (for adaptation, compliance, information, certification), 
risk insurance premium, contracting and coalition costs as well as the long-term (future) costs for 
recovering damages including associated transaction costs (disputes, expertise, low suits etc.) for 
claiming experienced losses7.  
In any case an individual, group, community, sectoral, chain, national and international efficiency of 
risk management have to be distinguished. It is often when elimination of a risk for one agent induce a 
                                                 
6 Thus some “uncovered” risk would normally remain. 
7 Most analyses of agri-food risk management usually ignore current and likely long-term transaction costs 
associated with the risk management. 
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(new) risk for another agent – e.g. agri-food price fluctuation causes income risk to producers but 
benefit speculators; application of chemicals reduce risk for farmers but produce significant negative 
effects (e.g. water, soil and air contamination) on residents, consumers, affected industries etc.  
Furthermore, risk management is only a part of the overall governance of divers (production, 
consumption, and transaction) activities of agents8. That is why the total efficiency (benefits, 
disadvantages, costs saving and risk minimization potential) of various modes for individual agents 
and public at large are to be taken into account9.  
According to the specific natural and socio-economic environment, personal characteristics of 
individuals, and social preferences, various structure of risk governance could evolve in different sub-
sectors, industries, supply chains, societies. In one extreme, the system of risk management would 
work well and only the “normal“ (e.g. entrepreneurial) risk would be left “ungoverned”. In some 
cases, market (free-market prices, competition) would fail to provide adequate risk governance but a 
variety of effective private modes would emerge to fill the gap - special contractual and organizational 
arrangements, vertical integration, cooperation. Often, both market and private governance may fail 
but an effective public involvement (regulation, assistance, support, partnerships) could cure the 
problem.  
Nevertheless, there are situations when the specific institutional and risk management costs structure 
would lead to failures of market and private modes as well as of the needed public (Government, local 
authority etc.) intervention in risk governance10. Consequently, a whole range of risks would be left 
unmanaged which would have an adverse effect on size and sustainability of agri-food enterprises, 
markets development, evolution of production and consumption, state of environment, and social 
welfare (Bachev, 2010). Depending on the costs and efficiency of the specific system of governance in 
a particular (sub)sector, region, country, supply chain etc. there will be unlike outcome in terms of 
“residual” risks, and dissimilar state and costs of human, food, environmental etc. security in different 
regions and period of time (Figure 1). For instance, when there is inefficient public enforcement of 
food, labor, environmental etc. safety standards (lack of political willingness or administrative 
                                                 
8 E.g. most of the managerial innovations in farming and agri-food chain have been driven by transaction 
costs economizing reason (Sporleder, 1992).  
9 Frequently minimization of the risk related costs is associated with an increase in production and/or 
transaction costs, and vice versa. Often risk elimination costs of one agent brings about a higher security for 
another agent in agri-food chain etc. 
10 Principally, when market and private modes fail there is a strong need for a public intervention in 
agriculture (Bachev, 2011b) 
 10
capability) then enormous “gray” agrarian and food sector develops with inferior, hazardous and 
counterfeit components. 
 
3. Factors of governance choice 
 
The forms of risk management in agri-food sector would depended on risk type, personal 
characteristics, institutional environment, progress in science and technologies, culture, social 
education and preferences, evolution of natural environment etc.  (Figure 1).  
Risk features like origin, probability of occurrence, likely damages, scale etc. are important factor for 
the governance choice. For instance, local risk could be managed though a private mode while most of 
market and environmental risks require collective actions at regional, national or transnational level. 
For high probability and harmful risks the agents will prefer more secure (more expensive) mode – 
security investment, purchase of insurance, keeping reserves, taking hostages, interlinked organization. 
Nevertheless due to lack of economic means many small farmers can not afford related costs and 
practice no or primitive forms of risk management – cash and carry deals, product diversification etc. 
Here there is a need for a third party (Government, international assistance) intervention though 
insurance, support, safety net etc. schemes to decrease farmers vulnerability. 
Personal and behavioral characteristics of agents (interests, preferences, knowledge, capability, risk-
aversion, reputation, trust, “contractual” power, opportunisms) are important factor for the choice of 
management form. For instance, some risks are not perceived (unknown) by private and public agents 
and therefore no risk management is put at all; in some cultures, the cooperative is the preferred mode 
of agrarian organization; experienced and trained farmer could design and manage bigger organization 
(hired labor) and more outside (credit, insurance, inputs supply etc.) contracts adapted to his specific 
needs; a risk-taking entrepreneur prefers riskier but more productive ventures etc.  
Behavioral factors such as individuals bounded rationality and opportunisms have been identified as 
responsible for the transaction costs and thus for the choice of organizational mode (Williamson, 
1996). Agents do not possess full information about the economic system (risks, price ranges and 
dynamics, trade opportunities, policy development) since collection and processing of such 
information is very expensive or impossible (multiple markets, future events, partners intention for 
cheating). In order to optimize decision-making they have to spent on “increasing their imperfect 
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rationality” (data collection, analysis, forecasting, training, consultation) and selecting forms 
minimizing related risks/costs (internal organization, “selling out” risk etc.).  
Agents are also given to opportunism and if there is an opportunity for some of transacting sides to get 
non-punishably extra benefit/rent from exchange he will likely to take an advantage of that11. Pre-
contractual opportunism (“adverse selection”) occurs when some of the partners use the “information 
asymmetry” to negotiate better contract terms. Post-contractual opportunism (“moral hazard”) occurs 
when some counterpart takes advantage of impossibility for full observation on his activities (by 
another partner, a third-party) or when he takes “legal advantages” of unpredicted changes in exchange 
conditions (costs, prices, formal regulations). The third form (“free ride”) occurs in development of 
large organizations where individual benefits are not-proportional to individual efforts (costs) and 
everyone tend to expect others to invest in organizational development and benefit from the new 
organization in case of a success (Olson, 1969).  
It is often costly or impossible to distinguish opportunistic from non-opportunistic behavior because of 
the bounded rationality (e.g. a farmer finds out that purchased seeds are not of high quality only during 
the harvesting time) and agents have to protect their rights, investments, and transactions from hazard 
of opportunism through: ex-ante efforts to find reliable counterpart and design efficient mode for 
partners credible commitments; and ex-post investments for overcoming (through monitoring, 
controlling, stimulating cooperation) of possible opportunism during contract execution stage 
(Williamson, 1996).   
In agri-food sector opportunism is widespread before signing insurance contract (not disclosing the 
real information for possible risks) or during the contract execution period (not taking actions for 
reducing damages when event occurs; consciously provoking damages in order to get insurance 
premium etc.). That augments considerably the insurance prices and restricts utilization of insurance 
contracts by small enterprises. On the other hand, insuree often “discover” the pre-contractual 
opportunism of insurers only after the occurrence of harmful event finding out that not all assurance 
terms (protected risks, extend of coverage of damages, ways of assessing damages, hidden costs) had 
been well explained and/or adapted to farmers needs.  
For many kind of farm related risks markets evolve very slowly and/or insurance services are 
practically inaccessible by majority of small operators. What is more, for many important risks 
                                                 
11 If there is no opportunism only risk related to bounded rationality would remain (natural, technical) and 
consequences easily recovered with cooperation and mutual benefit (risk sharing) of all parties. 
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insurance is not available “for purchase at all” – e.g. risk of lack of market demand for farm products, 
fluctuation of prices, possible opportunism of counterparts etc. That is why farmers have to develop 
other (private, collective) modes to safeguard their investments and rights or lobby for a public 
intervention in assurance supply. 
The institutional environment (“rules of the game”)12 is important factor for the management choice. 
For instance, in many countries some forms of risk governance are fundamental rights (on food, labor, 
environmental security and safety) and guaranteed by the state; public income support to farmers is 
“institutionalized”; environment and food safety standards could differ even between different regions 
in the same state etc. Furthermore, the (external) institutional environment considerably affects the 
level of transaction costs – e.g. in recent years tens of thousands of European farms and processors 
have been closed due to impossibility to adapt to (invest for) newly introduced EU standards for 
quality, safety, environmental preservation, animal welfare, certification etc.  
Principally, in conditions of stable and well-working public regulation (regulations, quality standards, 
price guarantees, quotas) and effective mechanisms for laws and contract enforcement, a preference is 
given to standard (spotlight and classical) market contracts. When rights and rules are not well defined 
or changing, and absolute/contracted right effectively enforced, that lead to domination of primitive 
form of risk management (subsistence farming, personalized and over-integrated forms) and high 
vulnerability to diverse (natural, private, market, contractual, policy) risks. The later was the case 
during post communist transition in East Europe characterized by fundamental restructuring, “rules 
change” and ineffective public enforcement, high exposure to “new” (natural, market, entrepreneurial, 
private, contractual, institutional, international) risks by the evolving private structures, unsustainable 
organizations, large gray economies, undeveloped or missing (agrarian credit, insurance, extension 
supply) markets,  individuals (e.g. thefts) and organized (providers of “security service”) risk 
introduction devastating private businesses and household welfare (Bachev, 2010).  
Dimensional characteristics of activity and transactions (combination of uncertainty, frequency, 
assets specificity, and appropriability)13 are critical for the management choice. When recurrence of 
transactions between the same partners is high, then both sides are interested in sustaining and 
minimizing costs of their relations (avoiding opportunism, sharing risk, building reputation, setting up 
                                                 
12 That is formal and informal rights and rules, and the system(s) of their enforcement (North, 1990). They are 
defined by (formal, informal) laws, tradition, culture, religion, ideological and ethical norms, and enforced by 
the state, convention, community pressure, trust, or self-enforcement. 
13 First three factors are identified by Williamson (1996), and the forth added by Bachev and Labonne (2000). 
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incentive, adjustment, and conflict resolution mechanisms). Here continuation of the relations with a 
particular partner/s and designing a special mode for transacting has a high economic value and costs 
for its development could be effectively recovered by frequent exchange. When a transaction is 
occasional (incidental) then possibility for opportunism is great since cheating side can not be easily 
punished by turning to a competitor (losing future business).  
When uncertainty surrounding transactions increases, then costs for carrying out and secure 
transactions go up (for overcoming information deficiency, safeguarding against risk). Since bounded 
rationality is crucial and opportunism can emerge the agents will use special private form diminishing 
transaction uncertainty – trade with origins; providing guarantee; using share-rent or output-based 
compensation; obligatory collateral for providing a credit; participating in inputs-supply or marketing 
cooperative; complete integration.  
Transaction costs get very high when specific assets for relations with a particular partner are to be 
deployed. Here costless alternative use of specific assets (loss of value) is not possible if transactions 
fail to occur, are prematurely terminated, or less favorable terms are renegotiated (in contract renewal 
time before the end of life-span of specific capital). Therefore, dependant investment/assets have to be 
safeguarded by special form such as long-term or tied-up contract, interlinks, hostage taking, joint 
investment, quasi or complete integration. Often, later is quite expensive, investment in specific capital  
not made, and activity/transactions can not take place or occurs without (or loss of) comparative 
advantages in respect to productivity. 
If a high symmetrical (risk, capacity, product, timing, location) dependency of assets of counterparts 
exists (regime of “bilateral trade”) there are strong incentives in both parties to elaborate special 
private mode of governance (e.g. interlinking credit, inputs and insurance supply against marketing of 
output). A special relational contract is applied when detailed terms of transacting are not known at 
outset (high uncertainty), and framework (mutual expectations) rather than specification of obligations 
is practiced. Here partners (self)restrict from opportunism and are motivated to settle emerging 
difficulties and continue relations (situation of frequent reciprocial trade). 
When unilateral dependency exists (unwanted “exchange”, quasi or full monopoly), then dependent 
side has to protect investments against possible opportunism (behavioral uncertainty/certainty) through 
integrating transactions (unified organization, joint ownership, cooperative); or safeguarding them 
with interlinked contract, exchange of economic hostages, development of collective organization to 
outstand asymmetrical dependency (for price negotiation, lobbying for Government regulations etc.).  
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Activity and transacting is particularly difficult when appropriability of rights on behavior, products, 
services or resources is low. Because of the bounded rationality, the costs for protection, detection, 
verification, and a third-party (court) punishment of unwanted exchange extremely high. Agents 
would either over-produce (e.g. negative externalities) or under-organize such activity (positive 
externalities) unless they are governed by efficient private or hybrid mode - cooperation, strategic 
alliances, long-term contract, trade secrets, or public order. 
The progress in science and technologies significantly improves risk management and facilitate 
diversification of its form. For instance, introduction of new (resistant) plant and livestock varieties; 
mechanization and standardization of operations and products; application of information, forecasting, 
monitoring, storage, and transportation technologies, all they improve significantly risk management 
in agri-food chain (COST Foresignt 2030; Hefnawy, 2011). Modern application of science and 
technologies is also application with production and/exposure to new type of risks – green-house gas 
emitions, genetic contamination, natural resource depletion, technical over-dependency etc. 
Finally, the evolution of natural environment – global worming, extreme weather, plant and animal 
diseases, drought, flooding and other natural disasters are posing series of new challenges for risk 
management in agrarian and food sector (Hefnawy, 2011; OECD, 2011). 
Identification of the “critical factors” of risk management choice, the range of practically possible 
forms, and their efficiency (costs and benefits) for individual agents, stage, subsectors, countries, food 
chains and public is to be a subject for a special micro-economic study. 
The comparative analysis is to be employed to select among feasible forms the most efficient one 
reducing the overall risk to “acceptable” level and minimizing the total (risk assurance and 
governance) costs. Most of the elements of the efficiency of risk governance are hardly to quantify – 
e.g. the individuals’ characteristics, the amount of risk, the level of benefits and costs14 associated with 
each mode etc. That is why a qualitative (Discrete structural) analysis15 could be used. The later 
matches the features of a risk to be managed (probability, significance, acceptance level, needs for 
collective action) and its critical (institutional, technological, behavioral etc.) factors with the 
comparative advantages (effective potential) of alternative modes to inform, stimulate appropriate 
                                                 
14 E.g. “measurement problems” associated with the transaction benefits and costs are well specified (Bachev,   
2011b). They also prevent utilization of traditional (Neoclassical) models simply by adding a new 
“transacting”, risk management etc. activity (Furuboth and Richter, 1998). 
15 Operationalisation of Discrete Structural Analysis of economic organization is done by Williamson (1981). 
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behavior, and align interests of associated agents, and to overcome, reduce, control, share, dispute, and 
minimize the overall costs of that risk.  
In a specific market, institutional, technological and natural environment the effective risk governance 
choice will depend on combination of risk features (probability of occurrence, likely magnitude of 
damages) and the critical dimensions of activity/transactions (appropriability, assets specificity and 
frequency).  Figure 3 presents a matrix with the principle forms for effective risk governance in agri-
food sector. For instance, high “standard” risk could be effectively managed through a free market 
mode such as a standard (classical) insurance, inputs supply, marketing etc. contracts. However, 
serious transacting risk exists when condition of assets specificity is combined with high uncertainty, 
low frequency, and good appropriability. Elaboration of a special governing structure for private 
transacting is not justified, specific (risk reducing) investments not made, and activity/restriction of 
activity fails to occur at effective scale (“market and contract failure”). Here, a third-part (private, 
NGO, public) involvement in transactions is necessary (assistance, arbitration, regulation) in order to 
make them more efficient or possible at all. The unprecedented development of special origins, 
organic farming, systems of “fair-trade” are good examples in this respect. There is increasing 
consumer’s demand (price premium) for organic, original, and fair-trade products associated with 
some forms of (natural, poor household, labor, quality etc.) risk management. Nevertheless their 
supply could not be met unless effective trilateral governance including independent certification and 
control is put in place. 
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                             Figure 2. Principle modes for risk governance in agri-food sector 
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4. Stages in analysis and improvement of risk management 
 
The analysis and improvement of risk governance in agri-food chain is to include following steps 
(Figure 3): First, identification of existing and emerging threats and risks in agri-food chain. 
Persistence of certain risks is a good indicator for ineffective management. Modern science offers 
quite reliable and sophisticated methods for assessing various risks to or caused by agri-food chain 
(DTRA & IIBR, 2011; Trench et al., 2011).  
 
 
Figure 3. Analysis and improvement of risk management in agri-food sector  
 
Second, specification of existing and other feasible modes of risks governance, and assessing their 
efficiency, sustainability and prospects of development. Efficiency of individual modes shows 
capability for risks detection, prevention, mitigation and recovery at lowest costs while sustainability 
reveals ”internal” potential to adapt to socio-economic, technological and environmental changes and 
associated threats and risks. A holistic framework for assessing the efficiency and the evolution of 
governing modes is suggested by OECD (2011) and Bachev (2010). That stage is to identify 
deficiencies of dominating (market, private, and public) modes to solve existing and emerging risks, 
and to determine the needs for (new) public intervention. For instance, when appropriability associated 
with transaction/activity is low, there is no pure market or private mode to protect from associated 
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risks16. Emerging of a special large-members organization for dealing with low appropriability to 
cover the entire “social” risk would be very slow and expensive, and they unlikely be sustainable in a 
long run (free riding). Therefore, there is a strong need for third-party public intervention in order to 
make protection of such risk possible or more effective – either pure public organization (e.g. public 
assurance for high damage natural or economic disasters) or “quasi public” mode (collective 
organization assisted/ordered by a third party) for high probable lower damaging risks (Figure 2). 
Third, identification of alternative modes for public intervention to correct (market, private, public) 
failures, assessing their comparative efficiency, and selection the best one(s). Comparative assessment 
is to be made on (technically, economically, politically) feasible forms as mode(s) minimizing the 
total risk management (implementing and transaction) costs selected. The analysis is to take into 
account the overall private and social costs – the direct and indirect (individual, third-party, tax payer, 
assistance agency etc.) expenses, and private and public transacting costs. The later often comprise a 
significant portion of the overall risk management costs and are usually ignored – e.g. costs for 
coordination, stimulation, mismanagement of bureaucracy; for individuals’ participation and usage of 
public modes (expenses for information, paper works, payments of fees, bribes); costs for community 
control over and for reorganization of bureaucracy (modernization and liquidation of public modes), 
and (opportunity) costs of public inaction, etc. 
Initially, existing and emerging problems (difficulties, costs, risks, failures) in organization of market 
and private governance have to be specified. The appropriate pubic involvement would be to create 
institutional environment for: making private investments less dependent, decreasing uncertainty 
surrounding market and private transactions, increasing intensity of exchange, protecting private rights 
and investments. For instance, State establishes and enforces quality, safety and eco-standards, 
certifies producers, regulates employment relations, transfers management rights on natural resources 
etc., and all that increases the efficiency of market and private risk management.   
Next, practically possible modes for increasing appropriability have to be considered. The low 
appropriability is often caused by unspecified or badly specified private rights and obligations. In 
some cases, most effective government intervention would be to introduce and enforce new private 
and groups (property) rights – on diverse type of risks and its trading; on natural and biological 
                                                 
16 Respecting others rights or “granting” risk protection rights to others could be governed by “good will” or 
charity actions (e.g. eco-sustainability movement initially evolved as a voluntary activity). In any case, 
voluntary initiatives could hardly satisfy the entire social demand especially if they require significant costs. 
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resources; on food safety and clean environment; tradable quotas for products, inputs, emissions; on 
intellectual property, origins etc. That intervention transfers organization of transactions into market 
and private governance, liberalizes market competition and induces private incentives (and 
investments) in certain agrarian risk management.  
In other instances, it is more efficient to put in place public regulations for risk minimization: for 
utilization of resources, products and services (standards for labor, product, environmental safety); 
introduction of foreign species and GM crops, and (water, soil, air, comfort) contamination; ban on 
certain inputs, products or technologies; regulations for trading ecosystem service protection; trade 
regimes; mandatory risk and eco-training and licensing of operators.  
In other instances, using incentives and restrictions of tax system is the most effective form for 
intervention. Different sorts of tax preferences are widely used to create favorable conditions for 
development of certain (sub)sectors and regions, forms of organization, segment of population, or 
types of activities. For instance, environmental taxation on emissions or products (inputs, outputs of 
production) is applied to reduce use or emissions of harmful substances; tax reduction us use to 
overcome negative consequences of natural disasters etc.  
In some cases, public support to private organizations is the best mode for intervention. Programs for  
modernization, enterprise adaptation, income support, environmental conservation, public risk-sharing 
etc. are common in all countries.  
Often providing public information, recommendations, and training to farmers, entrepreneurs, 
residence, and consumers in risk management is the most efficient form.  
In some cases, pure public organization (in-house production, public provision) is the most effective 
as in case of critical infrastructure; food safety inspections; research, education and extension; agro-
meteorological forecasts; border sanitary and veterinary control; recovery from natural catastrophe etc. 
Usually, specific modes are effective if they are applied alone with other modes of public intervention. 
The necessity of combined intervention (governance mix) is caused by: complementarities (joint 
effect) of individual forms; restricted potential of some less expensive forms to achieve certain (but 
not entire) level of socially preferred risk prevention and mitigation; possibility to get extra benefits 
(e.g. “cross-compliance” requirement for participation in public programs); specific critical 
dimensions of governed activity; risk and uncertainty (little knowledge, experience) associated with 
likely impact of new forms; administrative and financial capability of Government to fund, control, 
and implement different modes; and dominating policy doctrine. 
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The level of effective public intervention (governance) also depends on the kind of risk and the scale 
of intervention. There are public involvements which are to be executed at local (ecosystem, 
community, regional) level, while others require nationwide governance. And finally, there are risk 
management activities, which are to be initiated and coordinated at international (regional, European, 
worldwide) level due to strong necessity for trans-border actions or consistent (national, local) 
government failures. Very frequently effective governance of many problems and risks requires 
multilevel governance with system of combined actions at various levels involving diverse range of 
actors and geographical scales. 
The public (regulatory, provision, inspecting) modes must have built mechanisms for increasing 
competency (decrease bounded rationality, powerlessness) of bureaucrats, beneficiaries, interests 
groups and public as well as restricting possible opportunism (cheating, interlinking, abuse of power) 
of public officers and stakeholders. That could be made by training, introducing new assessment and 
communication technologies, increasing transparency, and involving experts, beneficiaries, and 
interests groups in management of public modes at all levels.  
Generally, hybrid modes (public-private partnership) are much more efficient than pure public forms 
given coordination, incentives, control and cost-sharing advantages. Involvement of farmers, 
beneficiaries and interest groups increases efficiency, decreases asymmetry of information, restricts 
opportunisms, increases incentives for private co-investment, reduces management costs. For instance, 
enforcement of most labor, animal welfare, environmental standards is often very difficult or 
impossible. Stimulating and supporting (assisting, training, funding) private voluntary actions are 
much more effective then mandatory public modes in terms of incentive, coordination, enforcement, 
and disputing costs (Bachev, 2010).   
If there is strong need for third-party public involvement but effective (government, local authority, 
international assistance) intervention in risk management is not introduced in a due time, then 
significant risks to individuals and public at large would persist while agrarian “development” is 
substantially deformed.  
Dealing with many problems and risks in agri-food sector/chain would require multiform, hybrid, 
multilevel, and transnational intervention, and therefore the appropriate governance mix is to be 
specified as a result of the comparative analysis. The later let improve design of (new) public 
intervention according to the specific conditions of food-chain components in particular country or 
region in terms of increasing security and decreasing costs. Suggested new approach also let predict 
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likely cases of (new) public failures due to impossibility to mobilize political support and resources or 
ineffective implementation of otherwise “good” policies in particular conditions. Since public failure 
is feasible, its timely detection permits foreseeing persistence/rising of certain risks, and informing 
local and international communities about consequences. 
The risk management analysis is to be made at different levels – individual component (inputs supply, 
farm, processing, transportation, distribution), regional, sub-sectors, food-chain, national, and 
international according to the type of risks and scales of collective actions necessary to mitigate the 
risks. It is not a one time exercise completing in the last stage with a perfect system of risk-
management. It is rather a permanent process which is to improve risk-management along with the 
evolution of socio-economic and natural environment, individual and communities’ awareness, and 
modernization of technologies. Besides, public (local, national, international) failure often prevails 
which brings us into the next cycle in improvement of risk-management in agri-food sector.  
For application of the suggested new approach besides traditional statistical, industry etc. data a new 
type of data are necessary for diverse type of risks and forms of governance, their critical factors for 
each agent, level of related benefits and costs etc. Such data are be collected though interviews with 
agri-food chain managers, stakeholders, and experts in the area.  
 
5. Contemporary opportunities and challenges for risk governance in agri-food chain 
 
Modern agri-food chains involve millions actors with different interests, multiple stages, and divers 
risks requiring complex, multilateral and multilevel governance at a large scale. For instance, number 
of farmers in EU is several millions, different food-processors and retailers are several hundred 
thousands, while final consumers reaches 500 millions17.  
Various existing and emerging (natural, technological, behavioral) threats and risks along with 
modern agri-food chains are well-identified (DTRA & IIBR, 2011; Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006; 
OECD, 2011).  
Diverse market and private modes have emerged to deal with specific risks driven by ethics, 
competition, consumer demand, business initiatives, and trade opportunities – e.g. direct marketing, 
voluntary codes (professional and corporate social, labor, environmental etc. responsibility), industry 
                                                 
17 figures get much bigger if we take into account the total number of global agents involved in EU agri-
food chain – farmers, processors, importers etc. from around the world. 
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standards, insurance schemes, guarantees, fair-trade, trade with brands, origins, organic and quality 
products (Figure 4).  
Furthermore, different bilateral and multilateral private forms are widely used to safeguard against 
risks, explore benefits, and facilitate exchange – e.g. clientalisation, contractual arrangements, 
cooperation, complete backward or forward integration.  
Special trilateral forms have evolved to enhance security and partners and consumers confidence 
including independent (a third-party) certification and inspection. Trade internationalization is 
increasingly associated with collective private actions (standards, control mechanisms etc.) at a 
transnational and global scale (e.g. GLOBALGAP). 
Property (security and safety) rights modernization, and market and private “failures” brought about 
needs and modes for public interventions (assistance, regulations, provision) in agri-food sector. 
Moreover, the scope and stringency of publicly-imposed rules expend constantly embracing new 
products, methods, dimensions (human, animal, plant, eco-health), hazards (GMC, nanotechnology, 
terrorism), and information requirements.  
Furthermore, globalization of exchange, and threats and risks increasingly require setting up 
transnational public order (e.g. ISO, WHO, FAO, WTO etc.). For instance, there are common 
(traceability, precaution, communication) principles, (food, veterinary, phytosanitary, feed, 
environmental) legislation, and implementing and enforcing agencies (EFSA, ECDC, ECHA) for agri-
food chains in EU (including imported products).  
Consumers concerns about the food-safety risks significantly increase after the major food-safety 
“events”/crisis in recent years (e.g. Avian flu; Mad-cow and Foot-and-mouth diseases; poultry 
salmonella; contaminations of dairy, berries, olive-oil; natural and industrial disasters impacts). For 
instance, since 2005 there is augmentation of respondents “worrying about food-safety problems” in 
EU and it comprise a significant share now (Figure 5); as much as 48% of European consumers (in 
Bulgaria 75%) indicate that consumed food “very or fairly likely” can damage their health etc. 
(Eurostat, 2010).    
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Modes of governance Risks 
market private public 
Natural disasters and 
extreme weather; 
Pests and diseases; 
Improper using 
pesticides and 
chemicals; 
Using contaminated 
water and soils; 
Improper animal health 
practices; 
Poor waste disposal; 
Using prohibited 
antibiotics; 
Using contaminated 
feeds; 
Animal-borne diseases; 
Improper handling and 
storage; 
Poor cooling system; 
Poor sanitation and 
hygiene; 
Using unhygienic 
containers, processing 
units, and 
transport facilities; 
Improper grading and 
packaging; 
Using prohibited food-
additives; 
Inputs, resources and  
output contamination; 
Chancing social 
demands; 
Market price fluctuation; 
Market failures; 
Political and 
institutional instability; 
Ignorance of agents; 
Opportunistic behavior; 
Criminal intrusion; 
Terrorist attacks 
Clientatli-
sation;  
Direct 
marketing; 
Informal 
branding;  
Insurance 
purchase; 
Organic 
production; 
Specific 
origins; 
Brands; 
Eco-system 
services; 
Special 
(quality, eco-) 
labeling; 
Outsourcing;  
Security 
services; 
Fair trade 
system; 
Standards 
insurance 
contcart; 
Hedging with 
future price 
contacts; 
 
Improved inputs, technology, 
variety and structure of production; 
Product and income diversification; 
Self-insurance forms; 
Patronage and community 
insurance; 
Voluntary initiatives; 
Professional codes; 
Building (good) reputation;  
Guarantees; 
Private producers labels and brands;  
Private traders labels and brands;  
Private and collective origins and 
specialties; 
Private products recalls; 
Long-term contracts; 
Interlink contracts (inputs and 
service supply against marketing); 
Inputs and service cooperatives; 
Production cooperation; 
Joint-ventures; 
Internal audits; 
NGOs; 
Professional and consumer 
associations; 
Good Agricultural Practice; 
Good Hygienic Practice; 
Good Manufacturing Practice;  
Good Transport Practice; 
Good Trade Practice; 
GLOBALGAP; 
Private and collective food quality 
and safety management systems;  
Certification; 
Licensing; 
Third-party verification; 
Inputs supply integration;  
Integration into processing and 
marketing; 
Franchises; 
Risk pooling and marketing 
cooperatives; 
Vertical integration; 
Consumers cooperatives 
Mandatory (products, process, labor, animal-welfare, environmental) quality and 
safety standards; 
Regulations/bans for using resources, inputs, technologies; 
Regulations organic farming; 
Quotas for emissions and using products/resources; 
Regulations for introduction foreign species/GMC; 
Regulations for plant and animal nutrition and healthcare; 
Licensing for using agro-systems and natural resources; 
Mandatory farming, safety, eco-training; 
Mandatory certifications and licensing; 
Compulsory food labeling and information; 
Public accreditation and certification; 
Mandatory records keeping and traceability coding; 
Public products recalls; 
Public food, veterinary, sanitary, border control; 
Public price and income support; 
Public preferential crediting; 
Public funding farms and processors adaptation; 
Public safety nets and disaster reliefs; 
Financial support to organic production, traditional and special products, private 
and collective actions; 
National GAPs, cross-compliance requirements; 
Public education, information, advise; 
Designating vulnerable/dangerous zones; 
Tax rebates, exception, breaks; 
Eco-taxation (emissions, products, wastes); 
Public eco-contracts; 
Public food and security research/extension;  
Assistance in farmers, stakeholders, security cooperation; 
Public promotion/partnerships of private initiatives; 
Public food security monitoring, assessments, foresights; 
Public prevention and recovery measures; 
Public compensation of (private) damages; 
Disposal of (old) chemicals, degradated lands and water purification;  
Protected Designation of Origin, Protected Geographical Indication, Traditional 
Specialty Guaranteed; 
European Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed; 
EU policies, support and enforcement agencies (EFSA, ECDC, ECHA, CFCA, 
OSHA, EEA); 
International Standardization Organization (ISO 22000); 
UN (FAO, WHO) agencies interventions (Codex Alimentarius; Early Warning 
Systems; Crisis Management Centers); 
Bilateral and multilateral trading agreements/rules (WTO); 
National and international anticrime/antiterrorists bodies 
Figure 4. Risks and modes of governance along with modern agri-food chain 
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Figure 5. Indicate if you are worried in relation with following food-safety problems (% of respondents) 
 
There are a number of (new) opportunities for risk governance in agri-food chain (Figure 6): 
First, advances and dissemination of technical food-chain, training and risk-management methods 
(microbiological, genetic, electrical, laser, robotic, immunological, chemical and biosensors, 
nanotechnology, ICT), integral and food-chain approaches, and research, monitoring, testing, 
decision, and foresighting capability for risk-detection, assessment, prevention, and mitigation (COST, 
2009; Trench at al., 2011). For instance, advancements in detection, assessment and mitigation 
methods and technologies associated with biological and chemical risks have been presented at a 
recent international conference (DTRA & IIBR, 2011). 
Second, modernization and international harmonization of institutional environment (private, 
corporate, collective, NGOs, public food-safety and related standards, rules, enforcements etc.). For 
instance, EU membership improves considerably the “rules of the game” in new member states; 
market access rules, and/or “corporate responsibilities” induce agri-food sector transformation of 
exporting countries in Africa, Latin America and Asia etc. 
Third, considerable development of specialization of activities (including in risk-taking, monitoring, 
management) and concentration of (integral) management in food-production, processing, servicing, 
and distribution - centralized innovation and enforcement; time, scale, and scope economies; easy 
third-party control etc. For instance, market share of three largest food-retailers comprise between 27-
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91% in EU states (Eurostat); food-safety training, certification, inspection, and information are big 
international business (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006) etc. 
 
 
Figure 6. Opportunities and challenges for risks governance in agri-food chain  
 
Forth, quasi or complete integration of food-chain’s consecutive or dependent stages creating mutual 
interests, and effective and long-term means for risk-perception, communication, and management. 
For example, in Bulgaria (raw) milk supply is closely integrated by (dairy) processors through on-farm 
(collecting, testing) investments and interlink (inputs, credit, and service supply against milk-delivery) 
contracts with stallholders, while dairy marketing is managed by branding and long-term contracts – 
standards and bio-labels (Bachev, 2011a).  
Fifth, increasing consumers “willingness to pay” for food-safety attributes such as chemical and 
hormone bans, safety and inspection labels, original and special products etc. (Trench at al., 2011). 
The later justify and make economically possible paying-back of costs for a special governance.  
Six, growing consumers’ (representation, organizations) and media involvement, and national and 
transnational (information, technical, managerial, training, certification) cooperation of partners and 
stakeholders improving agents choice, inducing public and private actions, enhancing risk-
management communication, efficiency, and speed.  
Modern development is also associated with a number of (new) challenges for risk governance in agri-
food chain: 
System of 
risk 
governance 
New opportunities 
- advances in technical methods, 
approaches, capability 
- modernization and harmonization 
of institutional environment 
- specialization of activity and 
concentration of management 
- integration of consecutive and 
dependent stages 
- consumers’ “willingness to pay” 
for food-safety attributes 
- consumers and media involvement 
- national and transnational  
cooperation 
New challenges 
- new threats/risks (evolution of 
nature, economies, demands, inputs, 
technologies, products, governance, 
exchange; adversary, terrorist attacks) 
- separation of risk-creation from risk-
taking (dependencies, externalities) 
- mass production, distribution, 
consumption vulnerability 
- high adaptation and compliance costs 
- unequal norms, implementing 
capability, policies, private strategies  
- (national/international) public failure  
- informal/gray agri-food sector 
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i/ Emergence of new threats, risks and uncertainty associated with the evolution of natural 
environment (e.g. climate change, water stress, “new” plant, animal and human hazards etc.) as well as 
new human induced economic, financial, food, food safety, water, environmental etc. crises at large 
(transnational, global) scales. 
ii/ Increasing new threats, risks and uncertainty connected with the inputs, technologies, and products 
differentiation and innovation – e.g. Fukushima nuclear accident severely affected agri-food sector; 
there are uncertainties associated with growing application of nanotechnologies and  GMCs  etc. 
(Eurostat). 
iii/ Increasing specialization and concentration of activity and organizations which separates “risk-
creation” (incident, ignorance, opportunistic behavior) and risk-taking (unilateral-dependencies, 
quasi-monopolies, spill-overs, externalities). That makes risk-assessment, pricing, communication, 
disputing, and liability through (pure) market and private modes very difficult and costly. For instance, 
cheating, misleading, and pirating are common in food-chain relations - high information asymmetry, 
detection, disputing, and punishment costs (Bachev, 2010). It is indicating that for food risk 
information consumers in EU trust more to “health professionals”, “family and friends”, “consumers 
associations”, “scientists” rather than “food producers” and “supermarkets and shops” (Figure 7). 
 
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
Your doctor and other health professionals
Family and friends
Consumers associations
Scientists
Environment protection groups
National and European food safety agency
Farmers
European institutions
Media (TV, newspapers, radio)
National Government
Information from internet
Supermarkets and shops
Food producers
Bulgaria
EU-27
 Source:Eurobarometer 73.5, 2010 
Figure 7. In case a serious food-safety risk is found I would trust for risk information to (% of respondents) 
iv/ Widespread mass production, distribution, and consumption increases vulnerability of agri-food 
chain expending scope and severity of natural, incidental, opportunistic, criminal or terrorist risks. For 
instance, in Europe there is a progressive number of official notifications based on market and non-
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member countries controls, food-poisoning, consumer complaints, company own-checks, border 
screening and rejections (Eurostat). 
v/ Increasing adaptation and compliance costs (capital, training, certification, documentation etc.) for 
rapidly evolving market and institutional environment which delay or prevent reformation of smaller 
farms and food-chain enterprises (Trench et al., 2011; Bachev, 2010). For instance, in Bulgaria dairy 
and meat processors adaptation to EU standards have continued 10 years while two-thirds of them 
ceased to exist before the country accession to the EU (Bachev, 2011a). 
vi/ Public and private food quality and safety standards and efficiency of their enforcement differ 
considerably between industries, countries, and regions (Humphrey and Memedovic, 2006). That is 
result of unequal norms (e.g. GAPs, formal and informal rules) and implementing and enforcing 
capability, and/or deliberate policies or private strategies (e.g. multinationals sell the “same” products 
with unlike quality in different countries). The “double/multiple standards” is responsible for the 
inequality of exchange, and dissimilar threats and risks exposure of individual agri-food systems. 
vii/ Wide spreading “public failures” in food-chain (risk) management – bad, inefficient, delayed, 
under or over interventions; gaps, overlaps, infighting and contradictions of different agencies and 
rules; high bureaucratic costs; unsustainable and underfunding etc. For instance, the Bulgarian Food 
Agency has been established with a 5 years delay; the Acquis Communautaire are still not completely 
implemented in the country (capability deficiency, mismanagement, corruption); trust to the EU rather 
than the national institutions prevails (Bachev, 2010). There are numerous instances of international 
assistance or governance failures when institutions are “imported” rather than adapted or designed for 
the specific local conditions (Bachev, 2010). 
viii/ Production, marketing, and consumption traditions, the high food or governance costs, the will 
and capacity deficiency, all they are responsible for persistence of a large risky informal/gray agri-
food sector around the globe without effective control, and substandard, fake, and illegitimate products 
and activities. For instance, merely one-third of the Bulgarian dairy farms comply with the EU milk-
standards, only 0.1% possess safe manure-pile sites, a half of produced milk is home-consumed, 
exchanged or directly sold (Bachev, 2010).  
ix/ Multiplying new treats and risks associated with the adversary (e.g. by a competitor) and terrorist 
attacks, and the emerging governing and exchange forms (e.g. street-sells; internet, phone and mail-
orders; shopping-trips). All they require specific/non-traditional risk-management methods and modes 
- guards; policing; intelligence; multi-organizational and transnational cooperation etc. 
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Conclusion 
 
The analysis of modes, efficiency and challenges of risk management in agri-food chain let us 
withdraw a number of academic, business and policies recommendations: 
First, the governance (along with technical, information etc.) issues are to take a central part in the risk 
management analysis and design. The type of threats and risks, and the specific (natural, 
technological, behavioral, dimensional, institutional etc.) factors, and comparative benefits and costs 
(including third-party, transaction, time) are to be taken into account in assessing efficiencies, 
complementarities and prospects of alternative (market, private, public and hybrid) modes. The system 
of risk management is to adapt/improved taking advantage of the specified new opportunities and 
overcoming/defending against new challenges. 
Second, more hybrid (public-private, public-collective) modes should be employed given coordination, 
incentives, control, and costs advantages. The (pure) public management of most agri-food-chain risks 
is difficult or impossible (agents opportunism, informal sector, externalities). Often introduction and 
enforcement of new rights (on food security, risk-management responsibility etc.), and supporting 
private and collective initiatives (informing, training, assisting, funding) is much more efficient. 
Third, a greater support must be given to multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary research on (factors, 
modes, impacts of) risk governance in agri-food chain in order to assist effectively the national and 
international policies, the design of modes for public interventions, and the individual, collective and 
business actions for risk management. 
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